that the quintessential British ritual of the afternoon tea is of similar recent vintage. Tea plantations in India were started by the East India Company in the 1820s to break the monopoly of the Chinese and to produce for British consumption. Only in postcolonial India tea became the widespread drink that I found in the 1970s and today 70 percent of India's huge tea production is consumed in India itself. It is hard to imagine India without tea, but it is even harder to imagine that that is such a recent phenomenon.
China's tea is a whole other story. Tea is made from the young leaves of what were originally trees that were for production reasons reduced to shrubs. There is all kind of speculation about the origins and development of tea (bitter drink, called tu or ming). The historian Barend ter Haar argues that in the 8 th Century it becomes a replacement for alcohol in the context of the rise of Buddhism (propagating bujiu 不酒 next to busha 不杀), and in the context of the emergence of the imperial exams where one needed to keep oneself awake.2 Its popularity grew to the extent that it became a major part of the tributary system. That tea is a useful alternative to alcohol is clear to anyone who has visited China, but how successful it is seems less clear. I have not participated in a banquet in which tea has replaced alcohol and my recollection of visiting several Yi groups in Sichuan is blurred and soaked in alcohol. Men can hardly refuse to drink alcohol if they want to make guanxi while women have an easier time.
Anyway, this is the baked cha as we know it and obviously besides making social relations smooth it has all kinds of medicinal purpose and effect too (different teas, different effects). Whatever the case may be tea is a Chinese commodity that became highly sought after by Western seafaring nations in the 17 th and 18 th century and most prominently by the British after they had defeated the Dutch sea power at the end of the 18 th century. Before that the Dutch had been the most important tea traders When I came to North India in the early 1970s I drank a lot of tea. Tea was available everywhere. It was cooked with milk and sugar and thus pretty nutritious. In fact, in my fieldwork it was the breakfast that my host served me every morning at 6 AM and the only thing I would get till 11 or 12 when the first (of two) meals were served. Alcohol was not available in the Hindu pilgrimage center where I did my fieldwork.1 More in general, drinking alcohol was a thing for men in secluded booth or at private parties and mostly not social, but to get drunk. It was also seen as a foreign thing. In my first passport I had a license to buy alcohol in the dry (alcohol-free) state of Tamil Nadu, mentioning that I as a foreigner needed alcohol. For the rest, drinking country liquor (and smoking beedi) was for the lowest castes and my Brahman hosts in North India would frown upon it. They would see it as habits that belong to lower natures and reproduce lower natures. So, tea was the drink and it was safe, because it was cooked. Only once in a while sharbat would be served, a sweet rosewater drink, or some fizzy soft drink like Limca (coca cola was banned in the 1970s; and now again in some states). Since it was the only real universal social drink (coffee was only served in elite coffee houses for men in cities). I took it for granted that it had been in India forever. Moreover, I was aware that tea was produced in Assam, Darjeeling and Ceylon, since we drank tea with these names in Holland. I never wondered why Indians mostly used a relatively cheap British tea brand, called Lipton.
These days of naiveté are over. I now realize that the tea with sugar that I drank at home in Holland had only been spread over the population in the 18 th century and and tea is still an important drinking item in Holland.
After that Britannia ruled the waves and the tea. Tea was the most important item in the China trade and since the Chinese did not need much from Britain in exchange it was paid for in silver. Sidney Mintz observes that tea, coffee, and chocolate were all introduced in the third quarter of the 17 th century, but that the British contribution was to add sugar to these bitter substances.3 He suggests that tea absorbed sugar more readily than coffee and that that was the reason that the sugar planters promoted tea. It is indeed striking how much tea came to define British drinking habits; much more than it did continental drinking habits. The Germans, French, and Italians drink much more coffee. Tea in Britain was first expensive and only drunk by the elite, but gradually in the eighteenth century the working classes also became hooked. The government levied taxes on tea and this became a major source of income. In Britain tea became a major part of the economy (much less so in China). Tea was 80 percent of the British East India Company's turnover. Mintz shows how dramatic sugar and tea changed the drinking and food habits of the British, but also how crucial these imports from the tropics were in the transformation of Britain's economy. At the same time he shows the rise of an entirely new labor regime, built on slavery, to produce sugar. Consumption and production go hand and hand. One powerful quote about the British East India Company: The trade imbalance between Britain and China was, obviously, something the British tried to change especially with the exponential growth of the tea trade. The solution was opium that was grown in India after it had become more and more under the control of the British who had defeated the French. The Qing government had forbidden the sale of opium and tried to stop British illegal trade. The 20.283 boxes of opium that the Qing official Lin Zexu had thrown in the ocean in 1839 (the cause of the first opium war) had an estimated value of 9 million dollar. After the opium war you had an increasing import, for example in 1860 60.000 boxes. Already between 1830 and 1860 the value of the opium export to China was larger than the value of the import of tea and silk from China 5 In 1797 the British government took over the opium monopoly from John Company.
Its early adventures in the Far
Famously the Qing did not think that China needed any imports from outside China, as illustrated in the following quote from a letter sent by Qianlong to George III:
"Our heavenly Kingdom has everything that it needs in abundance and there is no lack of any products within its boundaries. Therefore there is no need to import goods from Barbarians in exchange for our goods."
It is less clear and a subject of considerable debate among economic historians how much the Qing economy needed silver from Britain. Whatever may have been the case the flow of silver came to an end with the growing exchange of opium for tea.
British trade and imperial expansion went hand in hand. The first opium war was planned by the trader William Jardine of the opium importing firm Jardine, Matheson, and Company. He directly advised Palmerston in 1839-1840 how to conduct the war. On the Chinese side trading guilds (Hong) were active, but less able to influence state policies. While in Britain the tax on tea was a considerable part of the state's income, this was very marginal in China. The Daoguang emperor blocked the use of a harbor in Fujian where most of the tea came from, although that would have made costs ten times lower and everything was shipped via Kanton till the first opium war. That war was therefore also used as a means to force the Chinese to open more harbors close to the places of production. At the same time the British wanted to circumvent the Chinese monopoly on growing tea by starting plantations in Assam. The labor conditions were those of indentured labor under penal sanction which Hugh Tinker has called 'a new system of slavery' and which after the abolition of slavery came to characterize not only plantations in Assam, but plantations all over the British empire. 6The Indian populations that one finds today in Mauritius, Fiji, the Guyana's, Trinidad, Kenya, Uganda, South Africa are largely descendants of these indentured laborers. This was totally different from the small family businesses that grew tea in China. It is therefore the British imperial system that leads to plantation and conditions of slavery, not the cash crop itself ( Vries, p. 97). In general small farmers remained dominant in China till the 20 th century.
Despite the creation of tea plantations in India and Ceylon the British still needed increasing imports of tea from China and wanted to pay for it with opium from India. Opium was produced in Bengal and Bihar (called Patna Opium) and in West India (called Malwa Opium). Besides raw cotton and later cotton yarn it was the most important export item to China. Since the trade in opium was forbidden by the Qing government both Indian and British private traders played a significant role. The Indian ports were Calcutta and Bombay. The Indian traders were mostly Parsis, Jains and Hindu Marwaris as well as some Baghdadi Jews like David Sassoon and his sons who were to play a significant role in the rise not only of colonial Bombay, but also of Shanghai. The first Bombay traders to go to China were the Jivanjis who adopted the surname Readymoney. Many of the big merchant families of today's Bombay like the Wadias and the Tatas built their fortune in the China trade.
In Bombay the Parsi merchant Jamsethjee Jeejeebhoy had a special relation with the aforementioned William Jardine, the architect of the first Opium War. Jamsethjee built a fleet of cargo ships to serve the trade and in 1842 he was knighted for his leadership in business and philanthropy.7
As argued before Indians did not know tea but slowly got hooked to it during the 19 th century and became the world's largest tea producers. Indians did know opium, but I never read anywhere that opium was a big problem in India. When I did my fieldwork there was opium available in government-run shops as was hashish. Mc Kim Marriott has a hilarious account of the Holi (Spring) festival that is Bakhtinian in nature and in which he was given bhang (milk laced with hashish) and consequently was unable to write any field notes.8 Despite this widespread use of intocicants I have never encountered a widespread problem with it. The great addiction is alcohol. General consensus has it that it was a problem for Chinese and that it was created by the British to solve their trade Press, 1974 imbalance with China. In Frank Dikötter engaging SOAS inaugural lecture he calls China 'Patient Zero' of opium addiction and then goes on to bust the myth of China's opium addiction.9
In nineteenth-century England opium and laudanum were used against pain. It was not seen as causing widespread addiction and, in fact, people could use it in regular quantities throughout life without creating addiction. This was also the case in China, as the following quote from Dikötter shows: "Men and women would smoke a pipe or two at festivals and ceremonies several times a year without ever becoming regular users. R.A. Jamieson, a doctor in Shanghai, noted at the end of the nineteenth century that if those who smoked a few pipes on the occasion of a festival such as a marriage were to be counted, few adult males could be excluded, although regular consumers were very rare. A British consul based in Hainan also reported that 'although nearly everyone uses it…one never meets the opium-skeleton so vividly depicted in philanthropic works, rather the reverse-a hardy peasantry, healthy and energetic'." (Dikötter, p. 5).
Dikötter argues that the spread of opium 鸦片 yapian in China from the eighteenth century depended on smoking. Tobacco, found in America, and introduced in China in the late sixteenth century "became the ideal companion of tea, 烟茶, yancha. Opium was initially laced with tobacco, but this combination was dropped later. To smoke pure Patna opium from expensive pipes became a sign of high status and wealth. Smoking was a social experience and opium houses, like tea houses, sites of male sociability. The other reason to use opium was medicinal like in England, against fever and especially diarrhea. If it was so harmless, why did it become the object of narcophobia? For this Dikötter suggests a Foucauldian theory, pointing at the rise of the medical profession which wanted to monopolize opium, and the emergence of anti-imperial nationalism with its discourse of enslavement and physical weakness. In the 1940s, however, the Communist in Yan'an used the opium production and trade to finance its struggle against the Guomindang, but as soon as they gained power in 1949 they stamped it out in three years. Cigarette smoking, however, was stimulated. Not by chance therefore China is now the world's leading tobacco producer and consumer. What to make of the stories of tea and opium? A political economy narrative seems the most convincing and rather obvious. Sidney Mintz is the pioneer of a narrative that focuses on sugar and word capitalism. The commodity shapes the nature of production and consumption and 9 Frank Dikötter, ‚Patient Zero': China and the Myth of the ‚Opium Plague'. Inaugural Lecture at SOAS, University of London, 2003. connects worlds that were hitherto unconnected. The meanings given to such a commodity are secondary to the force of Capital. Whatever disputes about details there may be this is a compelling narrative, but it does not satisfy for it gives us no access to how people shape their understanding of these world historical processes. This is precisely Marshall Sahlins critique of Eric Wolf's 'mode of production' approach in Europe and the People without History. Sahlins examines the indeed quite fascinating refusal of the Qing emperors to be impressed or interested in the products of the British, thus only accepting silver in exchange for tea.10 As is typical for Sahlins' approach to intercultural encounters he makes much of the Qing understanding of Lord Macartney's visit to the emperor. According to Sahlins the Chinese emperor indeed had everything in his yuanmingyuan 圆明园, gardens of perfect brightness at the old summer palace that was partly destroyed in 1860 during the second Opium War. This was a huge curiosities cabinet like the ones one had in Europe but much bigger. This was the collection of tributes that signified the sovereign power over the world that was enjoyed by the Emperor. In Sahlins' words "By setting China apart while at the same time making it the central source of world order, this theory of civilization lends itself equally to projects of imperial expansion and cultural withdrawal, to hegemonic inclusions or xenophobic exclusions, according to the contingencies of the situation."(Sahlins 427-428) It was not that the Qing were 'self-sufficient', but that they found the barbarians too far away and thus too difficult to control. What we have here in Sahlins analysis are different cosmologies that clash. In work done by James Hevia and others, this analysis is complemented by an interpretation of ritual performance, centering on the question whether Lord Macartney had performed the koutou (kowtow). Hevia focuses on the 'guest ritual' (binli 宾礼) which itself is the basis of power, as in Geertz's power serves pomp, not pomp power.11 Where Sahlins puts the emphasis on cosmology, Hevia puts the emphasis on ritual (li), but, as both authors would probably agree, these two belong to each other. In Lydia Liu's interpretation of the Treaty of Tianjin after the second Opium War in 1858 the emphasis is on the translation of the word yi 夷，which the British insisted referred to Barbarians, while the Chinese insisted that it only referred to non-Han people.12 This can help us to see that what we have here are not just incommensurable ontologies, but in fact communications, negotiations, and trading commodities and trading insults. It has all to do with notions of hierarchy and precedence, but these notions are not independent of power relations. On both the Qing and the British side 'honor' and hierarchy play an important role, but they are part of political economy, not separate from it. To me it makes little sense to think that the Qing and the British did not understand each other, but they had very different objectives and interests. The Qing did not want to enter into the Age of Commerce on British terms, but that does not mean that they were not interested in trade. Moreover, at many other levels it was of course not the Beijing or the Westminster court that were central to actual trade, but local traders and local officials and, very importantly, illegal traders. In conclusion one might suggest that following the pathways of commodities is a very useful heuristic device, but it is not sufficient if one wants to understand the changes of political economy. These commodities are embedded in social relations and ideas of sociability. The fact that opium is produced in India but does not define international relations or political economy in the way it seems to have done in China shows already that it is not the commodity itself that provides us with a full explanation. That opium cannot have been the sole reason for 'the opium wars' seems clear from the fact that it is really after the successful establishment of tea plantations in India that the British feel impelled to force the Chinese to open their economy and society. 
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